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Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment Pragmatism 
Stephanos Bibas* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In three separate areas of criminal procedure—sentence enhancements, the 
admissibility of hearsay, and the regulation of defense counsel’s 
responsibilities—the Supreme Court has recognized major new pro-defendant 
doctrines in the new millennium. In each area, the Court has grounded its new 
doctrine in a different clause of the Sixth Amendment. And in each, Justice 
Scalia has forcefully advocated an originalist, formalist approach. 
In contrast, Justice Kennedy has been a notable voice of pragmatism in these 
debates, focusing not on bygone analogies to the eighteenth century but on a 
hard-headed appreciation of the twenty-first. He has opposed the Court’s radical 
overhaul of the Jury Trial Clause in the Apprendi/Blakely line of cases.1 He 
joined the Court’s new approach to the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. 
Washington,2 but has increasingly sought to rein in extensions of that approach.3 
And he has largely supported broader readings of the Assistance of Counsel 
Clause in defining defense counsel’s duties to investigate and advise on collateral 
consequences and plea bargaining.4 In each of these areas, Justice Kennedy has 
shown sensitivity to criminal practice today, prevailing professional norms, and 
practical constraints, as befits a Justice who came to the bench with many years 
of private-practice experience. While Justice Kennedy frequently votes with 
Justice Scalia in many other areas of criminal procedure, in interpreting the Sixth 
Amendment, his practical approach aligns him more closely with Justices Alito, 
Sotomayor, and especially Breyer. His touchstone is not a bright-line rule derived 
from history, but a flexible approach that is workable today. Notwithstanding the 
press’s assumptions about him as a swing Justice,5 his approach is remarkably 
consistent and principled. 
 
* Professor of Law and Criminology and Director, Supreme Court Clinic, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School. I was a law clerk to Justice Kennedy during the October Term 1997. Thanks to Shyam Balganesh 
and Rick Bierschbach for feedback on an earlier draft, and to the McGeorge Law Review for organizing and 
hosting a wonderful symposium. 
1. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326–28 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 523–54 (2000) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Kennedy & Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting).  
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3. See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(explaining Crawford’s rationale); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312 (2009). 
4. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
5. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Facing Weighty Ruling and New Dynamic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 
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This symposium Article unfolds in four parts, each of which explores one 
important theme of Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II 
explores the role that history plays in his opinions. Justice Kennedy is a moderate 
originalist, looking to history where it works but adapting it to modern realities, 
especially to new circumstances and new problems. Part III focuses on his 
common-law incrementalism and flexibility, in contrast to some other Justices’ 
rigid formalism. Part IV explains Justice Kennedy’s structural approach to the 
Constitution as fostering dialogue among branches and levels of government. He 
emphasizes federalism and checks and balances, not a strict separation of powers. 
Part V then underscores the importance of practicality and common sense in 
leavening theoretical abstractions. He looks closely at the purposes of laws, their 
effects, the lessons of expertise, and the existence of alternative solutions. This 
Article concludes that, in interpreting the Sixth Amendment, Justice Kennedy is 
fundamentally a practical lawyer, applying the humble wisdom born of 
experience rather than the rigid extremes that flow from a quest for theoretical 
purity. 
II. JUDICIOUS USE OF HISTORY 
Justice Kennedy understands that history is a useful tool but not an 
omnipotent one. His Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is one of moderate 
originalism where it works. He looks to history as a practical lawyer, valuing it as 
a guide to the contours and limits of a given principle. He credits history most 
where its lessons still carry weight today. His measured approach to the 
Confrontation Clause bespeaks his concerns for both history and practicality. But 
often there is no relevant history, and Justice Kennedy rightly resists extending 
historical rules far beyond their historical foundations. Finally, Justice Kennedy 
repeatedly acknowledges and grapples with new problems, instead of 
hypothesizing faux-historical answers to them. History, he sees, does not provide 
neat, prepackaged answers to all modern questions. 
A. Moderate Originalism  
Justice Kennedy respects the historical backdrop against which the Framers 
drafted and the United States adopted the Sixth Amendment. He joined Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Crawford, which swept away a muddled balancing 
test for Confrontation Clause violations.6 The primary pillar of Crawford’s 
reasoning was historical.7 The Sixth Amendment grew out of a reaction to the 
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh and the Crown’s substitution of ex parte interrogations 
 
2012, at A1. 
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–69 (overruling in relevant part Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), 
which had authorized admission of out-of-court statements by unavailable declarants where the statements “fall 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”). 
7. See id. at 43–56. 
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for live testimony and cross-examination.8 Trials at common law, unlike 
Continental civil-law systems, depended on live confrontation in open court, so 
that the jury could decide the witness’s credibility for itself.9 
This historical account rests on a powerful functional insight: when judges 
admit the fruit of out-of-court interrogations, they substitute their own judgments 
of reliability for those of the jury.10 Crawford also works as a best-evidence rule, 
preventing the government from engineering abusive interrogations to substitute 
for live testimony and cross-examination.11 And, as the majority opinion stressed, 
the “malleable [reliability] standard” had become “unpredictable [and] 
amorphous, if not entirely subjective.”12 It produced inconsistent and 
contradictory outcomes and so offered little safeguard against clear violations of 
the Confrontation Clause.13 Given the inconsistency, the older balancing-test 
approach merited little deference under stare decisis and required an overhaul.14 
Thus, originalist and practical considerations dovetailed in Crawford, illustrating 
how originalism can lead to consistent, practical results. 
B. The Absence of Relevant History  
Faithfulness to history, however, requires appreciating the practical 
differences between the present and the past. Justice Kennedy dissented from 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion extending Crawford to govern laboratory 
analysts’ reports.15 In doing so, Justice Kennedy highlighted that the Court was 
not interpreting the historical Confrontation Clause, but “expand[ing]” it by 
applying it to laboratory analysts.16 He understands that past historical episodes 
cannot be stretched to answer every present problem. 
Fidelity to history also requires acknowledging history’s limits. There may 
be no history relevant to a particular issue, or there may be competing historical 
analogues. Justice Kennedy sees that lab reports are a new, twentieth-century 
phenomenon. If there were any historical analogue, he argued, it was a document 
custodian’s authentication of a copy, which historically was admissible without 
live testimony.17 He has also noted that laboratory tests and reports in no way 
 
8. Id.  
9. Id. at 43.  
10. See id. at 56 (“[Historical sources] suggest that [cross-examination] was dispositive, and not merely 
one of several ways to establish reliability.”). 
11. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining 
Crawford’s rationale). 
12. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60, 63. 
13. Id. at 63–64. 
14. Id. at 68.  
15. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330–63 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
16. Id. at 345. 
17. Id. at 356–57. 
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resemble the systematic, extrajudicial examinations that sent Sir Walter Raleigh 
to his death18 based on “unreliable, untested statements.”19 
History’s limitations similarly hold true in the Apprendi line of cases, which 
extended the Jury Trial Clause to guarantee that juries find facts that raise 
maximum sentences.20 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy limited Apprendi’s 
rule to facts that raise maximum, not minimum, sentences.21 A key link in his 
reasoning was that while facts that raised maximum sentences were historically 
viewed as elements to be found by juries, there was no such historical practice 
for facts that triggered minimum sentences.22 
C. Acknowledging New Problems 
Finally, Justice Kennedy candidly recognizes new problems that one cannot 
resolve by mechanically applying originalism. The drafters of the Confrontation 
Clause could not have foreseen the new challenges posed by lab analysts’ 
reports, as Justice Kennedy twice stressed in dissent.23 In sharp contrast, Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion analogized laboratory reports to the accusations 
introduced against Sir Walter Raleigh, brushing aside Justice Kennedy’s 
distinctions between historical fact witnesses and scientific expert witnesses.24 
The drafters of the Jury Trial Clause, who knew nothing of modern 
sentencing hearings, could not have addressed mandatory minimum sentences or 
structured sentencing guidelines, as Justice Kennedy suggested in his Harris 
majority opinion and Blakely dissent.25 In contrast, Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Blakely cited “the control that the Framers intended” juries to have 
over sentencing without acknowledging the novelty of sentencing hearings and 
guidelines.26 
Most strikingly, the drafters of the Assistance of Counsel Clause lived in a 
world without plea bargains. They could not have foreseen that public 
prosecutors and defense counsel would come to dominate the criminal process 
 
18. Id. at 344–47.  
19. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
20. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000). 
21. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568–69 (2002). Apprendi’s historical assertions were 
themselves on shaky historical ground, as Justice Kennedy noted in joining Justice O’Connor’s dissent. See 
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 525–29 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Kennedy & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); 
Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 
1097, 1123–32 (2001) [hereafter Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding]; Jonathan Mitchell, Apprendi’s Domain, 2006 
SUP. CT. REV. 297, 330–42 (2006). 
22. Harris, 536 U.S. at 560–61. 
23. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 345–47 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2726–27 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
24. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 315–17. 
25. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 323 (2004) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and 
Kennedy & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id. at 328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Harris, 536 U.S. at 560–61. 
26. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 306. 
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and dispose of ninety-five percent of criminal cases through plea bargaining.27 In 
response, Justice Scalia lamented plea bargaining as a “necessary evil” and 
would have confined defense counsel’s responsibility to criminal trials and 
sentences.28 Justice Kennedy, in stark contrast, recognized the right to effective 
counsel during plea bargaining precisely because plea bargaining has become the 
landscape of modern criminal justice: 
The State’s contentions [that the Constitution guarantees only a full and 
fair trial] are neither illogical nor without some persuasive force, yet they 
do not suffice to overcome a simple reality. Ninety-seven percent of 
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the 
result of guilty pleas. The reality is that plea bargains have become so 
central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense 
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities 
that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the 
Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical stages. 
Because ours “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of 
trials,” it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a 
backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. “To a large 
extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] 
determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea 
bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is 
the criminal justice system.” In today’s criminal justice system, 
therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a 
trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.29 
For the same reason, Justice Kennedy joined Justice Stevens’ majority 
opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky, recognizing the right to effective advice about the 
possible consequence of deportation.30 Padilla rightly noted that plea bargains 
resolve most criminal cases and that defendants need their lawyers’ help to weigh 
their pros and cons.31 And, dissenting in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Justice 
Kennedy pointed out that extending Crawford would mean giving defendants a 
new plea-bargaining chip that would usually result in lower sentences instead of 
vigorous cross-examination at trial.32 
 
27. See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3–6, 15–20 (2012). 
28. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494–96 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
29. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (alterations in 
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 and Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea 
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
30. 130 S. Ct. at 1486. 
31. See id. at 1484–86. 
32. 557 U.S. 305, 354–55 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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III. COMMON-LAW INCREMENTALISM AND FLEXIBILITY 
A second notable feature of Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence is his common-law sensibility. That sense is manifest in his respect 
for settled practices and precedents. It also appears in his humility and concern 
for the disruptive effect of new decisions. And it leads him to favor flexibility 
and incrementalism and eschew rigid formalism. 
A. Concern for Settled Practice and Precedent 
Throughout his Sixth Amendment opinions, Justice Kennedy has repeatedly 
adverted to how actors in the criminal justice system in fact do their jobs. His 
Confrontation Clause dissents have explored how lab analysts receive and test 
various specimens, interpret results, prepare reports, establish chains of custody, 
and testify by reading their notes.33 His opinions endorsing sentence 
enhancements consistently canvas a range of state sentencing practices.34 And, in 
recognizing a right to effective counsel during plea bargaining, he noted that its 
contours would be guided by ABA and state performance standards adopted over 
the past three decades.35 
Justice Kennedy’s concern likewise extends to settled precedent. Stare 
decisis is an important safeguard of tradition and predictability. Thus, Justice 
Kennedy has emphasized how the Apprendi line of cases represents a break with 
practice and precedent.36 In dissent, he noted that the majority’s hostility to 
judicial sentence enhancements was at odds with the Court’s earlier decisions 
upholding judicial consideration of recidivism and judicial capital sentencing.37 
And, writing for the Court, he limited Apprendi’s reach by reaffirming the 
Court’s precedent authorizing judges to find facts that trigger minimum 
sentences.38 Justice Kennedy’s respect for precedent has led him to acquiesce in 
precedent with which he originally disagreed.39 Thus, as just noted, in dissent he 
feared that an expansive reading of the Sixth Amendment would imperil judicial 
 
33. Id. at 330–47; Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2723–27 (2011). 
34. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295–97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (addressing 
California’s distinction between offense-based and offender-based sentence enhancements); Harris v. United 
States, 536 U.S. 545, 559–60, 567–68 (2002) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (canvassing federal and state 
statutes authorizing mandatory minimum sentences triggered by various sentencing factors and the absence of 
any settled practice to the contrary); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 257 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(noting that “common [state] practice discloses widespread reliance on victim-impact factors for sentencing 
purposes”); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326–28 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
35. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
36. See, e.g., Jones, 526 U.S. at 270–72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
37. See id. (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246 (1998) and Walton v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002)). 
38. Harris, 536 U.S. at 556–68 (reaffirming McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87–90 (1986)). 
39. Compare Jones, 526 U.S. at 270–72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), with Ring, 536 U.S. at 589 (Ginsburg, 
J., majority opinion, joined by Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter & Thomas, JJ.). 
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capital sentencing.40 Nevertheless, once the Court embraced that reading in 
Apprendi, he bowed to that precedent, joining the majority’s application of 
Apprendi to judicial capital sentencing.41 
Justice Kennedy’s respect for precedent carries over to the Confrontation and 
Assistance of Counsel Clauses as well. He has twice emphasized that extending 
Crawford to lab analysts would overturn ninety years of contrary precedent from 
thirty-five states and six federal circuits.42 And in opposing the 
constitutionalization of what documents a defense lawyer must review before 
trial, Justice Kennedy criticized the majority’s approach as “a radical departure 
from Strickland and its progeny.”43 His more innovative Sixth Amendment 
rulings have come on issues not governed by binding precedent, where he has 
addressed new questions about defense counsel’s responsibilities in plea 
bargaining.44 
B. Humility and Disruption  
In interpreting the various clauses of the Sixth Amendment, Justice Kennedy 
has called upon his colleagues to remain humble and aware of their own 
limitations. Dissenting in the precursor to Apprendi, he criticized the majority for 
needlessly reaching out in a routine statutory-construction case to flag 
constitutional questions and reopen settled issues.45 In one of his Confrontation 
Clause dissents, he assailed how “confidently” the majority “disregard[ed] a 
century of jurisprudence.”46 In another Confrontation Clause dissent, he 
underscored the Court’s own institutional limitations. As he put it, “this Court 
lacks the experience and day-to-day familiarity with the trial process to suit it 
well to assume the role of national tribunal for rules of evidence.”47 That 
institutional humility is the flip side of relying on precedents and standards 
previously generated by state and federal legislatures, lower courts, and bar 
authorities. 
Just as he hesitates to overturn precedents and legislation, Justice Kennedy is 
cautious about intruding upon lawyers’ considered judgments.48 Courts must 
hesitate, he argues, to “restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making 
 
40. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 270–72. 
41. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589 (Ginsburg, J., majority opinion, joined by Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter & 
Thomas, JJ.) (overruling Walton, 497 U.S. 639, in part). 
42. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330, 349–52 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
43. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 399 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
44. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 
S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., majority opinion). 
45. Jones, 526 U.S. at 254, 265–68, 270 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
46. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
47. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
48. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 400–03 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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tactical decisions,” so defense counsel can triage their limited resources.49 Most 
notably, in interpreting effective assistance of counsel, his opinion for the Court 
took the Ninth Circuit to task for “accord[ing] scant deference to counsel’s 
judgment.”50 “Plea bargains are the result of complex negotiations suffused with 
uncertainty, and defense attorneys must make careful strategic choices in 
balancing opportunities and risks.”51 Appellate review must guard against 
hindsight bias, lack of familiarity with the particular prosecutor and judge, and 
lack of a trial record.52 Thus, he reasoned, “judicial caution” is “imperative” and 
habeas courts’ role is limited to policing “manifest deficiency” by defense 
counsel.53 
Judicial intervention, he stresses, often comes at the high cost of disrupting 
expectations and finality as well as settled practices.54 The majority’s expansion 
of the Confrontation Clause imposes an “as-yet-undefined set of rules,” leaving 
states to “guess what future rules this Court will distill from the sparse 
constitutional text.”55 He has also emphasized that a broad reading of Apprendi 
would disrupt expectations and cast doubt on settled practices as well as already-
final sentences.56 “We are left to guess whether [various sentence-enhancement 
statutes] might be in jeopardy,” because the precursor to Apprendi “raises more 
questions than the Court acknowledges.”57 
C. For Flexibility, Against Rigidity and Formalism 
The common-law method calls for flexibility and experimentation. Thus, in 
the Apprendi line of cases, Justice Kennedy has strongly favored leaving 
legislatures and sentencing commissions the flexibility to experiment with a 
range of solutions to modern sentencing problems.58 He favors “[c]ase-by-case 
judicial [sentencing] determinations” that legislatures can then distill and codify, 
followed by further “incremental judicial interpretation” that embodies common-
law flexibility and caution.59 And he has opposed adopting any “particular set of 
detailed rules” governing defense attorneys’ duty to review particular records, as 
 
49. Id. at 400. 
50. Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 740 (2011). 
51. Id. at 741. 
52. See id. at 741–42. 
53. Id. at 741. 
54. See id. 
55. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 331 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); accord 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
56. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 296 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Harris v. United 
States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 254, 
271 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
57. Jones, 526 U.S. at 268 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
58. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 295–96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296, 326–27 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
59. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 326–27 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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counsel need “independence” and “wide latitude . . . in making tactical 
decisions.”60 
The flip side of Justice Kennedy’s support for flexibility is his opposition to 
rigidity and formalism. He opposed “a per se rule requiring counsel in every case 
to review the records of prior convictions” as a “rigid requirement” and a “radical 
departure” from precedent.61 His dissents frequently criticize the majority’s 
“wooden formalism,”62 its “formalistic and wooden rules,”63 and its “wooden, 
unyielding insistence” on extending Apprendi.64 Formalism is not just wooden, 
but iron: “The iron logic of which the Court is so enamored would seem to 
require in-court testimony from each human link in the chain of custody.”65 Other 
jurists might embrace “iron logic” as an aspiration or compliment, but to Justice 
Kennedy, it is a cold, inhuman epithet.66 
Formalism’s basic problem, Justice Kennedy sees, is that it reifies and 
freezes rules, heedless of their costs or the underlying values served. Thus, he has 
been one of the staunchest opponents of the Apprendi line of cases, which 
adopted a formalistic but easy-to-evade rule against letting judges find facts 
triggering sentence enhancements.67 As he observed in dissent, “[n]o 
constitutional values are served by so formalistic an approach, while its 
constitutional costs in statutes struck down . . . are real.”68 One would imagine 
that formalism would at least make the law easier to predict. But when 
formalistic rules are “divorced from any guidance from history, precedent, or 
common sense,” one can only guess how far the Court will take them, so they do 
not even guarantee predictability.69 
IV. FOSTERING EXPERIMENTATION AND DIALOGUE 
Flexibility and incremental improvements go hand-in-hand with 
experimentation and dialogue. As Justice Kennedy understands, a range of legal 
actors need freedom to experiment and improve rules over time. Thus, at the 
national level, he emphasizes the need for checks and balances, rather than a 
strict separation of powers, to foster interbranch dialogue. That same vision 
 
60. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 399–400 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61. Id. at 399–400; accord id. at 400, 404 (criticizing “a rigid, per se obligation that binds counsel in 
every case and finds little support in our precedents” as little different from “a bright-line rule” and a “rigid 
requirement[]”). 
62. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
63. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
64. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
65. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 336 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
66. See id.  
67. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326–28 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 523–54 (2000) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Kennedy & Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting).  
68. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 267 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
69. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 337 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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applies to the states, as federalism allows each state to innovate and serve as a 
laboratory of experimentation. Thus, he opposes Sixth Amendment formalism in 
large part because it would shut down various branches’ and states’ fruitful 
interplay. 
A. At the National Level: Checks and Balances 
In interpreting the Sixth Amendment, Justice Kennedy insists that judges 
must not usurp legislatures’ leading role. In opposing the Apprendi doctrine, he 
has stressed that legislatures, not courts, enjoy the constitutional prerogative to 
define crimes.70 Courts should not micromanage how legislators do their jobs by, 
for example, “chastising Congress for failing to use the approved phrasing.”71 
Legislatures may entrust sentencing judges with finding a wide range of 
sentencing factors. Though Apprendi “set[s] the outer limits of a sentence” by 
defining a crime’s elements, within the sentencing range “the political system 
may channel judicial discretion—and rely upon judicial expertise.”72 Legislators 
and voters have relied upon this flexibility, so courts should hesitate to unsettle 
this practice.73 Though Justice Kennedy has spoken out against mandatory 
minimum sentences as “unwise,”74 he has pointedly declined to write that policy 
view into the Constitution. After acknowledging criticisms of mandatory minima, 
his opinion for the Court held that the Constitution permits judicial findings to 
trigger them, “leav[ing] the other questions to Congress, the States, and the 
democratic processes.”75 
Deference to legislatures promotes interbranch dialogue: an ongoing 
conversation among legislatures, courts, and other actors. Though he joined the 
principal dissent in Blakely, Justice Kennedy also dissented separately to 
underscore how the majority’s rule thwarted that dialogue.76 He stressed the 
“fundamental principle under our constitutional system that different branches of 
government ‘converse with each other . . . .’”77 Quoting Justice Jackson’s 
separation-of-powers analysis in the Steel Seizure Case, Justice Kennedy 
emphasized that the Constitution structures branches that are interdependent, not 
just insulated.78 Legislatures and judges should constantly cooperate, as 
legislatures codify patterns of individual adjudications, judges in turn interpret 
 
70. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 270 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
71. Id. at 267. 
72. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567 (2002) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
73. Id. at 567–68. 
74. Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct., Speech at the American Bar Association 
Annual Meeting 4 (Aug. 9, 2003) (transcript on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
75. Harris, 536 U.S. at 568–69. 
76. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326–28 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
77. Id. at 326 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989)).  
78. Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))). 
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and refine legislation, and so on.79 “Sentencing guidelines are a prime example of 
this collaborative process,” which “is basic constitutional theory in action.”80 
Collaboration is not only intrinsically valuable as part of the democratic 
process, but it also helps the law to grow. As Justice Kennedy put it in his 
Blakely dissent, “[t]his recurring dialogue . . . [is] an essential source for the 
elaboration and the evolution of the law.”81 Judges, probation officers, and 
legislatures must cooperate on an ongoing basis to improve structured 
sentencing.82 
One of Justice Kennedy’s key insights is that different actors have different 
strengths. As a former litigator, he has great respect for jury service. Thus, in a 
jury-selection case, he objected that race-based peremptory challenges violate 
jurors’ right to serve and participate in administering the law.83 But jurors’ short-
term service is both a strength and a weakness. Because individual jurors serve 
for only short periods, they lack the breadth, expertise, commitment, and ability 
to develop standards over time.84 Other criminal justice actors compensate for 
those deficiencies. Judges, probation officers, and prison officials have the broad, 
long-term, professional outlook needed to develop sentencing standards. These 
professionals must work together, engaging in ongoing conversations about 
sentencing reform under the direction and oversight of legislatures.85 Legislatures 
should remain free to draw upon both their own “collective wisdom” and judicial 
expertise while simultaneously channeling and limiting judicial discretion, 
instead of having to delegate everything or nothing to judges.86 A rope is much 
stronger when it comprises many different strands; none of the rope’s strands 
runs the whole length, but each contributes a distinctive strength to the whole. 
B. In the States: Federalism and Experimentation 
The same logic calls for even greater deference to state criminal-justice 
practices. Invoking Justice Brandeis’s famous metaphor, Justice Kennedy 
explained that states have an interest in “serv[ing] as laboratories for innovation 
and experiment.”87 By stark contrast, the Court in Blakely destroyed democratic 
legislatures’ reforms, rejecting “the accumulated wisdom and experience of the 
 
79. Id. at 326–27. 
80. Id. at 327. 
81. Id. 
82. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295–97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
83. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406–10 (1991). 
84. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 295–97 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
85. See id. 
86. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 327 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Harris v. United 
States, 536 U.S. 545, 559, 567 (2002) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
87. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
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Judicial Branch,” and ordered states to discard the ideas, experience, and reforms 
they had carefully developed.88 
Deference to states also undergirds Justice Kennedy’s Confrontation Clause 
dissents. He objected that “[t]he Court dictates to the States, as a matter of 
constitutional law, an as-yet-undefined set of rules” without offering much 
guidance, leaving states to guess what future mandates lie in store.89 States need 
flexibility to develop the rules of evidence as they assess new scientific tests and 
pressing problems such as statements by battered women who are later killed by 
their abusers.90 Yet the Court’s Sixth Amendment formalism has frozen in place 
the rigid, primitive slogans of colonial hearsay law, hobbling state reforms.91 
In contrast, when states have already converged on a particular solution, 
Justice Kennedy is more comfortable drawing upon it as the fruit of collective 
experience. Thus, in recognizing a right to effective counsel during plea 
bargaining, he specifically noted that state and federal bar associations and courts 
had already specified defense attorneys’ plea-bargaining obligations.92 Likewise, 
Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion in Padilla, which emphasized “[t]he 
weight of prevailing professional norms,” both federal and state, that require 
defense lawyers to warn non-citizens of the risk of deportation.93 
V. PRACTICALITY AND COMMON SENSE 
As befits a practical lawyer’s approach, Justice Kennedy’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence is not abstract and rigid, but rather practical and common-sensical. 
He frequently adverts to the point or purpose of a particular law or clause, 
declining to extend meaningless formalism for formalism’s sake.94 He also defers 
to the reasonable professional judgments and expertise of judges, legislatures, 
and other sentencing professionals—not just juries.95 He is sensitive to the limited 
time, money, and resources that require these professionals to perform triage and 
make delicate tactical tradeoffs.96 He cares a great deal about the practical effects 
of various rulings, especially those that confer windfalls or impose pointless 
 
88. Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
89. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 331 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
90. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2725, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
91. Id. at 2727 (citing David A. Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 S. CT. REV. 1, 5–6, 36). 
92. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
93. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). 
94. See, e.g., Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2726 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause).  
95. See, e.g., Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741–43 (2011) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (showing 
deference to attorneys weighing the pros and cons of plea bargains). 
96. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 403 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (rejecting a 
requirement that defense attorneys read each document in connection with a defendant’s prior convictions). 
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costs.97 Finally, he repeatedly discusses alternative remedies to minimize the 
costs and disruption caused by new rulings.98 
A. The Relevance of Purpose 
Justice Kennedy’s touchstone is the purpose served by a particular clause. 
His Confrontation Clause dissents have repeatedly sought to limit Crawford to 
cases where the government is effectively substituting out-of-court interrogation 
for in-court confrontation.99 Confrontation of fact witnesses serves both to 
impress upon them the gravity of their testimony and to limit the influence of ex 
parte government interrogations. In open court, witnesses may refine or recant 
their accounts, and they are free of the one-sided pressures of the interrogation 
room.100 But “[i]t is difficult to perceive how the Court’s holding [applying 
Crawford to lab analysts’ reports] will advance the purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause.”101 As a practical matter, lab analysts differ from fact witnesses in 
multiple ways. They report near-contemporaneous observations of tests, observe 
neither the defendant nor the crime, and respond to scientific protocols rather 
than interrogation.102 Challenges to their testimony usually turn not on credibility, 
perception, or bias, but on methodology and chain of custody, facts that can 
easily be challenged in other ways. “The Confrontation Clause is simply not 
needed for these matters. Where, as here, the defendant does not even dispute the 
accuracy of the analyst’s work, confrontation adds nothing.”103 
Justice Kennedy’s focus on purpose extends to guaranteeing effective 
counsel as well. In dissent, he opposed a bright-line requirement that defense 
lawyers review the entire case file of all prior convictions.104 Investigation is 
good, but it is a means to an end: “[E]ach new requirement risks distracting 
attorneys from the real objective of providing vigorous advocacy as dictated by 
the facts and circumstances in the particular case.”105 Defense attorneys must 
exercise independent tactical judgment in pursuing that goal in a variety of ways, 
particularly given their limited time and resources.106 
 
97. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 355 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(worrying that the majority’s holding will create a bargaining opportunity for defendants). 
98. See, e.g., Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2726–27 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting an alternative to 
the majority rule). 
99. Id. at 2726. 
100. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 338–39 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 343–47. 
103. Id. at 340. 
104. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 396 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
105. Id. at 402. 
106. Id. at 400–01, 403. 
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B. Deference to Professional Judgment and Expertise 
In that vein, Justice Kennedy understands that professionals need wide but 
not limitless latitude. Thus, dissenting from the requirement that defense lawyers 
review all case files, he emphasized that defense counsel make “sound strategic 
calculation[s]” to forego certain investigations and lines of argument in lieu of 
others.107 The Constitution does not guarantee a scorched-earth defense that 
leaves no stone unturned. Indeed, state ethical rules may require defense lawyers 
to conduct such triage.108 He has likewise emphasized that competent lawyers 
must delicately weigh the risks of striking a plea bargain versus proceeding to 
trial, and courts must not second-guess their judgments in hindsight.109 That is 
particularly true because a defense attorney is a repeat player who may have a 
sense of how particular prosecutors and trial courts are likely to respond, and 
habeas courts have a very limited role in policing only “manifest deficiency in 
light of information then available to counsel.”110 
When defense lawyers’ performance falls outside that wide latitude, 
however, reviewing courts must enforce the most basic professional standards of 
criminal practice. Defense attorneys must, for instance, meet the minimal 
standard of communicating formal plea offers from prosecutors to their clients.111 
Federal and state bar authorities and courts have adopted that standard over the 
past three decades, and it is not too much to expect lawyers to live up to that 
basic obligation.112 
The same respect for expertise informs Justice Kennedy’s deference to 
sentencing reforms. He has repeatedly advocated leaving plenty of room for 
legislatures, judges, and other policymakers to develop and refine sentencing 
rules in light of evolving experience. Sentencing guidelines exemplify 
interbranch collaboration, in which legislatures draw upon the “accumulated 
wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch . . . on a matter uniquely within 
the ken of judges.”113 “Judges and sentencing officials have a broad view and 
long-term commitment to correctional systems” and should be encouraged to 
keep refining sentencing systems under legislative guidance, instead of leaving 
everything to juries.114 He lamented that the Apprendi line of cases appeared to 
have been driven by “a faintly disguised distrust of judges.”115 
Respect for professional expertise also informs Justice Kennedy’s 
Confrontation Clause dissents. In opposing the extension of Crawford to 
 
107. Id. at 401. 
108. See id. at 404. 
109. See Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741–43 (2011) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
110. Id. at 741. 
111. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
112. See id. 
113. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 327 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta v. 
United States, 484 U.S. 361, 412 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295–96 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
115. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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laboratory analysts’ reports, he stressed the “scientific and professional norms 
and oversight” to which analysts are subject, which differentiate their testimony 
and the means of challenging it from that of fact witnesses.116 
C. Limited Time and Resources  
Another practical constraint that Justice Kennedy acknowledges is that time 
and money are limited. Defense attorneys are overburdened and must carefully 
husband their limited time and attention for the most meritorious issues. Thus, he 
rejected the notion that defense lawyers must read every document in the case 
file of every prior conviction, for such a requirement would siphon resources 
away from other important tasks.117 
Resource constraints likewise counsel against extending the Confrontation 
Clause to scientific reports. Trial courts are slow and overburdened, and analysts 
must now fly around the state or country, waiting for hours or days before 
testifying in hundreds of cases each year, even though many defendants plead out 
at the last minute.118 
D. Practical Effects 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy is acutely sensitive to rulings that will do little 
good or cause harm. The Court’s Confrontation Clause rulings, he has charged, 
are “formalistic and pointless,”119 as they require lab analysts to testify even 
though they will simply “read aloud notes made months ago.”120 Similarly, he has 
criticized the Apprendi doctrine as disruptive, formalistic, and devoid of 
countervailing practical benefits, because Congress can easily draft around 
formalistic rules.121 
Such pointless rulings do little to protect the innocent; instead, they confer 
windfalls on the guilty. For example, the Crawford rule may exclude statements 
by abused women about the abusers who later murdered them, regardless of the 
statements’ reliability.122 The rule may also exclude autopsies conducted by 
 
116. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 345–46 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
117. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 403 (2005) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
118. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 340–42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
119. Id. at 338.  
120. Id. at 342. 
121. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294–97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (worrying 
that the “wooden, unyielding” Apprendi doctrine was causing “systemic disruption” and inflicting “collateral, 
widespread harm to the criminal justice system and the corrections process”); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296, 326 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the majority did “considerable damage to our laws and 
to the administration of the criminal justice system”); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 267 (1999) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority was apparently “chastising Congress for failing to use 
the approved phrasing in expressing its intent . . . . No constitutional values are served by so formalistic an 
approach, while its constitutional costs in statutes struck down or, as today, misconstrued, are real.”). 
122. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Giles v. 
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coroners who died before trial, which effectively creates “a statute of limitations 
for murder.”123 In practice, the confrontation right will not expose inaccuracies in 
lab analysts’ methodologies and results. Instead, it will become a plea-bargaining 
chip, which defendants will exchange for more lenient sentences.124 “Guilty 
defendants will go free, on the most technical grounds, . . . adding nothing to the 
truth-finding process,” simply because an analyst was sick or unable to make it to 
court in time.125 
Justice Kennedy is especially attuned to the practical problems plaguing 
twenty-first-century criminal justice. Court dockets are clogged and slow, as 
mentioned above. In addition, legislatures and sentencing commissions must 
work with judges to guide judicial discretion and reduce sentence disparities.126 
And his opinions have repeatedly depicted plea bargaining as a complex, 
uncertain, opaque, yet prevalent process of trading leniency for finality. Judges, 
he has noted, must defer to lawyers’ careful, tactical judgments while still 
policing basic professional norms in plea negotiations.127 Particularly because 
plea bargaining is so prevalent, Justice Kennedy has expressed concern about 
letting extraneous factors influence bargained-for sentences.128 
E. Alternative Remedies 
Justice Kennedy’s opinions frequently evince his concern that poorly chosen 
rules may impede better rules or reforms. Instead of formalistic rules that 
preempt further debate, Justice Kennedy has suggested a variety of alternative 
remedies that could solve many of the same problems. Rather than requiring the 
prosecution to call every lab analyst to the witness stand, defendants could be 
free to call them whenever they wished to challenge the accuracy of the analysts’ 
results.129 Governments could implement other safeguards to regulate laboratory 
analysis, such as having independent agencies perform routine tests en masse, 
following scientific protocols subject to oversight, issuing result-blind reports, 
and giving defendants rights to retest evidence for free.130 
As for plea bargaining, Justice Kennedy’s opinions have regulated the 
process while encouraging safeguards to prevent surprise and fabricated claims. 
 
California, 554 U.S. 353, 402–03 (2008)). 
123. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 335 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Carolyn Zabrycki, Comment, 
Toward a Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody the Qualities of a Testimonial 
Statement, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1093, 1115 (2008)). 
124. Id. at 355. 
125. Id. at 342–43. 
126. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 295–96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting). 
127. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Lafler v. 
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion); Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 
(2011) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
128. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 354–55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
129. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 340–41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
130.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Courts could require making plea agreements in writing, placing them on the 
record, and subjecting them to judicial colloquy.131 Reviewing courts can 
experiment with a range of possible remedies and take into account a defendant’s 
expressed willingness to plead.132 Finally, Justice Kennedy has suggested limiting 
Apprendi to offense facts, leaving judges free to impose enhancements based on 
offender facts such as recidivism, remorse, cooperation, and criminal history.133 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Journalists and academics sometimes mischaracterize Justice Kennedy as 
unprincipled because they fail to discern his consistent underlying approach. At 
root, Justice Kennedy is not an ideologue, eager to drive a pure theory over a 
cliff. He is a seasoned, practical lawyer, one who respects the wisdom of the 
bench, bar, and legislatures, not to mention precedent and settled practices. In 
interpreting the Sixth Amendment, Justice Kennedy takes care to conserve the 
wisdom immanent in the legal craft while reforming its excesses and outliers. 
That humble approach is a welcome counterpoint to other Justices’ abstract Sixth 
Amendment formalism. His approach lends stability to the law, counterbalancing 
others’ zealous theoretical purity with practicality and common sense. 
 
 
131. Missouri, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–09 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
132. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
133. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294–97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
